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This box is part of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” for 2021 Q2
Overview
After its Governing Council meeting on 10 June, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) released its latest 
projections for the euro area, covering the period 2021-
2023.1 This box describes the projections for the Spanish 
economy that constitute the Banco de España’s 
contribution to these aggregate euro area forecasts. The 
projections for Spain include the new information that has 
come to light in the period from the publication date of the 
previous projections (23 March, in Economic Bulletin 
1/20212) to 27 May. 
The recovery the Spanish economy embarked on in the 
second half of last year was interrupted in 2021 Q1, when 
GDP fell by -0.5%, according to INE’s preliminary 
estimates (a rate very close to the Banco de España figure 
of -0.4% in its March baseline scenario). This fall-off in 
output was in a setting in which the rise in the incidence 
of the pandemic around the turn of the year made a 
tightening of the measures applied to contain it necessary, 
and in which other temporary factors (including the 
snowstorm in early January and the blocking of the Suez 
Canal) also exerted something of an adverse impact on 
economic activity. In any event, the decline in the 
incidence of the pandemic as from early February allowed 
for a gradual easing in restrictions, which was conducive 
to a progressive improvement in activity over the course 
of the quarter.
On the latest information available, this rebound in activity 
has stepped up notably in Q2, in line with the more 
favourable course of the pandemic. Specifically, progress 
in the vaccination campaign has led to a reduction in 
infections which, since they are moreover concentrated in 
younger population groups, has given rise to a fall in the 
proportion of serious cases and, therefore, of deaths. That 
has provided for a gradual easing of the lockdown 
measures, marked most notably by the end of the state of 
alert on 9 May. 
The improved conjunctural data is particularly patent in 
firms’ response to the latest edition of the Banco de 
España Survey on Economic Activity (EBAE by its 
Spanish acronym),3 in effective Social Security 
registrations (i.e. discounting furloughed workers) and in 
the confidence indicators. In all instances, a common 
feature is that the recovery is sharper in services, in 
keeping with the partial lifting of the restrictions that 
weighed on those activities in which social interaction 
plays a key role. And that, in short, is – from the standpoint 
of the productive sectors – widening the base 
underpinning the recovery. By way of example, the PMI 
services index has stood since April, for the first time in 
almost a year, at levels consistent with the expansionary 
behaviour of the sector’s value added.
In light of this information, GDP is expected to rise 
significantly in quarter-on-quarter terms in Q2. However, 
the uncertainty over the scale of this rebound is high. 
First, estimates from the short-term models are beset by 
the logical constraints derived from the relative shortage 
of data for Q2. In particular, there is no quantitative 
information on developments in activity in June, and that 
for May is very limited. Further, interpreting the incoming 
data has become more complex as from this quarter 
because the year-to-year comparisons have lost much of 
their informativeness (since they are set against the 
months in 2020 subsequent to the outbreak of the 
pandemic).4 Given the caution these considerations 
demand, it is estimated that GDP growth in Q2 could rise 
to 2.2% quarter-on-quarter under the baseline scenario of 
these projections.
Despite the favourable recent developments, the 




1  See the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, June 2021.
2  Compared with the Macroeconomic projections in Spain (2021-2023), published as Box 1 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” in 
Economic Bulletin 1/2021, the current projections include the changes observed between 16 March and 18 May in the technical assumptions, in the 
budgetary assumptions and in the projected course of the external setting of the economy (except regarding the euro area, for which the data cut-off 
date is 26 May). Furthermore, the projections include the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) preliminary estimates for 2021 Q1. 
3  M. Izquierdo (2021), Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad (EBAE): tercera edición, Notas Económicas, Economic 
Bulletin 2/2021, Banco de España.
4  Further, from a more technical perspective, the difficulties the models are experiencing in correctly interpreting the incoming data (given that these are 
more influenced by the ups and downs of the pandemic and the restrictions adopted to counter its effects than they are by the changes in economic 
dynamics) are being compounded in these months, because of the diminished capacity of the procedures to isolate the purely seasonal component 
of the series.
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influenced by the uncertainty as to the time horizon 
needed to fully overcome the health crisis. The current 
acceleration in the ongoing vaccination rollout is 
contributing, as indicated, to containing the rate at which 
the pandemic is spreading. And that provides a favourable 
setting for the Spanish economy to embark upon a 
sustained growth phase. Yet, on the other hand, the very 
lifting of the containment measures is checking the decline 
in the rate of reproduction of the virus, which prevents 
fully ruling out the possibility of a fresh outbreak of the 
pandemic, as shown by the experience of some 
economies which have moved forward more swiftly than 
Spain in the vaccination process. These difficulties in fully 
controlling the virus in the short term, which also – 
naturally – affect other economies in our orbit, are 
significant for Spain insofar as our productive structure 
rests to a greater extent than in other countries on tourism, 
a fact all the more important given the proximity of the 
summer high season. Specifically, drawing on the tourist 
sector’s latest forecasts, it is estimated under the baseline 
scenario of these projections that tourism exports will 
post, in Q3 this year, a level close to 50% of that recorded 
in the same period in 2019 (see Chart 2).
In line with the official forecasts, the projections consider 
that, by late August, 70% of the Spanish population will 
have been vaccinated. Thereafter, it would be possible to 
take further steps towards lifting and ultimately eliminating 
the containment measures by end-2021.5 Under this 
assumption, activity in Spain as from the second half of 
this year would cease to depend on epidemiological 
considerations. 
The projections envisage a continuation of the surge in 
activity until end-2021, in step with the pick-up in the 
productive sectors that have so far been most affected by 
the pandemic-related restrictions. The increase in output will 
be boosted, moreover, by a series of additional factors. First, 
the outlook for growth in Spain’s trading partners is gradually 
improving, assisted by the ongoing support of economic 
policies globally.6 The recovery in world markets is being led 
by the advanced economies, whose progress in terms of 
vaccination has been much greater than that of the emerging 
countries taken as a whole. The improvement in Spanish 
export markets has been particularly marked in the cases of 
the United States – where the economic outlook has been 
assisted by the recent fiscal policy announcements – and, to 
a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.
Moreover, the monetary policy measures adopted by the 
ECB to date and the fiscal policy measures in Spain will 
continue, over the projection horizon, to provide 
considerable support to aggregate demand and to private 
agents’ incomes. That will restrict, under this baseline 
scenario, the scarring the crisis may leave on the productive 
system and labour market (in terms of the destruction of 
firms and of increased structural unemployment). Also, 
that would limit the scale of the phenomena involving the 
financial amplification of the crisis, resulting from the 
“doom loop” of worsening solvency of households and 
firms on one hand, and of financial institutions on the 
other. Among the economic policy measures that will be 
conducive to increasing the pace of activity, it is specifically 
worth mentioning the Next Generation EU (NGEU) 
programme.
Compared with the March exercise, the overall impact of 
the changes in the current projection assumptions on 
economic growth is positive. Specifically, the favourable 
effects on activity of the more dynamic performance of 
external markets exceed the negative impact of certain 
other assumptions, including in particular higher crude 
prices and, to a lesser extent, the appreciation of the 
exchange rate.
In consequence, GDP growth is expected to reach 6.2% 
in 2021 overall (see Chart 3 and Table 1). The period of 
high output growth rates up to the end of 2021 will be 
followed by another period of more moderate growth up 
to the end of the projection horizon. However, the strong 
economic momentum during the rest of this year will 
give rise to a significant carry-over effect on the average 
rate of change of GDP in 2022, of 5.8%. In 2023, GDP 
growth will slow to 1.8%.7 GDP will not return to its pre-
5  The EU vaccination strategy calls on Member States  to accelerate vaccine rollout, so that “by summer 2021, Member States should have vaccinated 
a minimum of 70% of the adult population”.
6  The assumptions on export market developments, which are set out in greater detail in Annex 1, are drawn from the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, June 2021.
7  See J. González Mínguez and C. Martínez Carrascal (2019), “The relationship between average annual and quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates: 
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pandemic level until the last part of 2022, and will be 
1.9% above that level at the end of the projection 
horizon. This suggests that the impact of the health 
crisis, albeit temporary, will be relatively persistent (see 
Chart 4). 
These projections, in comparison with those published in 
March, include an upward revision of GDP growth for 
2021 and 2022 (of 0.2 pp and 0.5 pp, respectively), which 
reflects the positive impact on activity of the change in the 
projection assumptions and the greater dynamism of GDP 
in the current quarter. This offsets the modest negative 
effects associated with the revision of the historical data.8
The uncertainties relating to the pandemic and its 
economic consequences
The level of uncertainty surrounding the course of the 
pandemic has decreased significantly since the last 
8  According to the INE flash estimate, the quarterly decline in GDP in Q1 was 0.1 pp more than that envisaged in March under the baseline scenario. 
The latest Quarterly National Accounts figures also entailed minor revisions to the growth rates of the previous two quarters. All this means that the 
starting point of the level of activity for these forecasts is somewhat less favourable, from the standpoint of the annual average growth rate in 2021, 
than was anticipated under the baseline scenario published in March.
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projection exercise. However, as described above, these 
uncertainties are still relatively high, especially in the very 
short term. In addition, even when the health crisis is over, 
the consequences of the pandemic will remain. These 
consequences may take very different forms, ranging 
from possible scarring in terms of destruction of the 
productive system and higher long-term unemployment, 
to changes in economic agents’ behaviour. In view of 
these sources of uncertainty, and as has been the case 
since the start of the pandemic, two alternative scenarios 
are formulated, the benign and the adverse scenario.
In the very short term, the differences between the two 
scenarios are warranted, as indicated above, by the scant 
volume of data available at the current juncture on 
2021 Q2 and by their hard-to-calibrate relationship with 
economic activity, in a setting in which the relationship 
between this variable and the mobility indicators has 
recently tended to become less stable. 
In the second half of 2021, one of the aspects that 
changes in the different scenarios is the course of the 
pandemic. The alternative scenarios include the same 
vaccination timeline as the baseline scenario, since 
considerably fewer uncertainties are now envisaged in 
this respect. Under the benign scenario the decline in the 
incidence of the pandemic observed in recent weeks 
continues, enabling the easing of the remaining restrictions 
on economic activity to be brought forward. By contrast, 
the adverse scenario envisages the possibility of fresh 
infections, possibly linked to the appearance of variants 
of the virus that are more infectious and may be resistant 
to vaccines, requiring the re-establishment of restrictions 
on movement and on some economic activities that entail 
high levels of personal contact. These alternative 
assumptions are critical to determine the rate of recovery 
of tourism in the summer months.
In 2022 and 2023 the differences between the various 
scenarios are not related to the course of the pandemic, 
but they do have as a common denominator the 
uncertainty surrounding the economic consequences of 
the pandemic in the medium term, insofar as possible 
changes in economic agents’ behaviour are concerned, 
and also the possible scarring of the Spanish productive 
system as a result of the crisis.
Possible changes in households’ behaviour have direct 
implications for two components of aggregate demand: 
private consumption and tourism flows. In the case of 
private consumption, the pandemic has triggered a huge 
surge in the household saving rate, given that households 
have substantially reduced their current expenditure in a 
setting in which their income has scarcely been affected 
thanks to the economic policy measures adopted.9 This 
increase in the saving rate has been partly forced by the 
9  See “Household saving during the pandemic and its possible effects on the future recovery in consumption”, Box 4, “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin 1/2021, Banco de España.
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q1.
a Projections cut-off date: 27 May 2021.
b Annual average.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023 2020 2021 2022 2023
June 2021 (baseline scenario) -10.8 6.2 5.8 1.8 -0.3 1.9 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.1 15.5 15.6 14.7 13.7
March 2021 (baseline scenario) -11.0 6.0 5.3 1.7 -0.3 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.1 15.5 17.0 15.1 14.1
GDP
Harmonised index of 
consumer prices (HICP)
Unemployment rate
(% of labour force) (b)
HICP excluding energy 
and food
Table 1
MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change
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pandemic containment measures which made it 
impossible to consume certain goods and services. And it 
is partly attributable to more precautionary saving by 
households against the backdrop of uncertainty.
Over the projection horizon, the lifting of the measures 
imposed thus far to contain the virus will see the forced 
saving component disappear completely, while the lower 
uncertainty should lead the voluntary saving component 
to shrink. Under the baseline scenario, it is assumed that 
the saving rate steadily declines over the coming years, 
although the average for 2023 would remain somewhat 
above its pre-crisis level (see Chart 1). This implies that 
the high volume of savings built up since the onset of the 
pandemic would not be reduced. Several factors support 
this assumption. First, it is chiefly higher-income 
households that have saved and they have a lower 
propensity to consume. Second, the suppressed spending 
may not be easily recovered, since most would have been 
spending on services (such as hotels and restaurants, for 
example) that cannot be easily deferred (unlike spending 
on durable goods). Lastly, households may decide to 
voluntarily restrict their spending levels in anticipation of 
higher taxes in the future on account of the high volume of 
government debt built up during the crisis.
Under the benign scenario, it is assumed that households 
will use a portion of the savings built up in the form of 
liquid assets during the crisis to increase their 
consumption. The corollary to this would be a more 
pronounced reduction in the household saving rate 
compared with the baseline scenario, to stand below pre-
crisis levels from 2022. By contrast, under the adverse 
scenario, more cautious behaviour by households will 
lead to a somewhat slower recovery in consumption, such 
that the saving rate will hold above pre-crisis levels 
throughout the projection horizon.
The pace of recovery in tourism exports also varies 
between the scenarios. This owes, in the near term, to 
the differing assumptions regarding the course of the 
pandemic and, from 2022, agents’ attitudes towards 
spending, including the levels of precautionary saving 
they wish to maintain, how far the preference – seemingly 
observed since the onset of the pandemic – for domestic 
tourism is reversed and, in the case of firms, the 
resumption of business travel. At the end of the projection 
horizon, inbound tourism flows will stand close to pre-
crisis levels under the baseline scenario and above pre-
crisis levels under the benign scenario. They will remain 
around 10% below pre-crisis levels under the adverse 
scenario.
As regards the fallout of the crisis on the productive 
system, as has been noted, the baseline scenario 
envisages moderate scarring at the aggregate level. As an 
example, in the labour market, the average expected 
unemployment rate in 2023 (13.7%) is 0.4 pp below that 
observed in 2019, the last year prior to the onset of the 
pandemic, yet this does not reflect a decline in the labour 
force, which on the contrary is expected to grow by 0.4% 
between 2019 and 2023 in average annual terms. Similarly, 
given the projected trajectory for non-financial 
corporations’ gross investment and the pace of 
consumption of fixed capital, the corporate capital stock 
would be higher in 2023 than prior to the pandemic. These 
favourable developments partially reflect the effectiveness 
of the policies deployed to address the crisis, one of 
whose central aims was precisely to stave off any lasting 
damage to the economy’s productive capacity. They also, 
in part, owe to the fact that, although the crisis has had a 
very severe impact on some sectors (such as hospitality), 
the bulk of the effects are likely to be temporary, since a 
priori these sectors were not oversized; this stands in 
contrast to the global financial crisis, when there was an 
evident need to reduce capacity in the construction 
sector. 
However, despite these positive aspects, it cannot be 
ignored that the crisis may bring about far-reaching 
structural changes in the economy’s productive system, 
requiring the reallocation of factors of production between 
different sectors and firms. Unlike the baseline scenario, 
the more benign scenario assumes that this reallocation 
of resources will be frictionless. By contrast, under the 
adverse scenario, the overindebtedness of some 
segments of the corporate sector, on account of the 
lengthy period of severely reduced revenue during the 
pandemic, will lead to a higher volume of business failures. 
The subsequent adverse impact on banks’ capital ratios 
would drive up the cost of finance for households and 
firms, while also reducing its availability, with the ensuing 
adverse repercussions for economic activity.
Under the benign scenario, GDP growth in 2021 would be 
somewhat higher than under the baseline scenario 
throughout the projection horizon, which would allow GDP 












Chart  4). By contrast, the more moderate pace of GDP 
recovery under the adverse scenario would see GDP remain 
slightly short of its pre-crisis level at end-2023.
Developments	in	the	main	macroeconomic	
aggregates	in	the	baseline	scenario
From the standpoint of the composition of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. However, the contribution of the 
external sector to GDP growth will also be positive over 
the three-year projection horizon. 
All components of private domestic demand will rebound 
strongly this year after declining sharply in 2020 (see Table 
2). Private consumption declined in 2021 Q1, affected by 
the tightening of the pandemic-containment measures at 
the start of the year. However, according to the indicators 
available, this aggregate has strengthened in the current 
quarter. This greater dynamism seems to be borne out by 
the lower accumulation of household bank deposits and 
the slight increase in consumer lending. As vaccines are 
rolled out, a loosening of the restrictions that, despite the 
easing in Q2, still constrain some activities is to be 
expected. This will allow the expansionary behaviour of 
this aggregate to continue.
Consumption will also benefit from the gradual recovery in 
the labour market and, as a result, in household income, 
where the weight of labour income will increase at the 
expense of public transfers. In addition, the gradual 
decline in uncertainty over the health and economic 
developments will likely favour a reduction in the 
precautionary component of saving and further boost 
household spending. As a result, consumption would rise 
by 7.1% in 2021 under the baseline scenario. In 2022, on 
average, the rate would still be high (5.7%) owing to the 
positive carry-over effect stemming from the strong 
growth expected between Q2 and Q4 this year. 
Consumption would reach its pre-pandemic level in early 
2023. 
Among the components of gross capital formation, 
residential investment is similarly expected to regain 
upward momentum as uncertainty is dispelled and future 
household income expectations, which have been 
adversely affected by the deterioration in the labour 
market since the outbreak of the pandemic, improve. An 
additional factor that will boost growth in this aggregate is 
the implementation of the NGEU. In this regard, in the 
detailed description of how Spain would use the transfers 
it receives from the European Recovery and Resilience 
Facility, a large amount is allocated to housing 
rehabilitation, according to the Recovery, Transformation 
and Resilience Plan (RTRP).
In line with its expected recovery profile over the projection 
horizon, investment by non-financial corporations will be 
particularly buoyant in 2021 H2, spurred by the 
implementation of the NGEU, the recovery in final demand 
(which will increase capacity utilisation) and the gradual 
decline in uncertainty. The different productive sectors’ 
digitalisation needs, which have increased after the 
pandemic, would also contribute to a rise in this aggregate, 
in a setting of low financing costs, although these are 
expected to increase somewhat.
In any event, productive investment will foreseeably 
behave unevenly across sectors. In particular, in those 
industries whose revenues have dwindled significantly as 
a result of the measures applied to contain the pandemic, 
there will be firms emerging from the health crisis with a 
weakened financial position. They are therefore more 
likely to face a shortage of funds with which to undertake 
new investments.10 In this respect, it should be noted, 
first, that this financial distress should be alleviated by the 
measures put in place to support viable firms in a 
vulnerable situation and, second, that the investment 
needs of these firms are unlikely to be high, at least in the 
short term, given their current low level of capacity 
utilisation. 
The pandemic has had a significant impact on trade with 
the rest of the world. Its effect has proved much more 
short-lived in the case of goods flows, which have now 
returned to pre-crisis levels, than in tourism, as the 
restrictions still in place impinge much more strongly on 
the movement of people between different countries. 
However, a number of factors simultaneously at play at 
the beginning of the year dampened the vigour of goods 
exports. These include the shortage of electronic 
10  See Chapter 3 “The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the productive sectors in Spain: economic and financial implications”, Annual Report 2020, 
Banco de España. 








components – which especially affected the car industry, 
whose share of Spanish goods exports is particularly high 
(11%) – and certain logistical difficulties associated with 
the implementation of Brexit or the Suez Canal obstruction. 
The first of these factors is relevant, insofar as there is a 
risk that it could persist to some extent throughout 2021. 
By contrast, the different stimulus packages announced 
in the United States (the destination of 5% of Spain’s 
goods exports), which are included in the external 
assumptions of this projections exercise, will contribute 
positively to the buoyancy of goods exports.
In the case of tourism exports, the fresh wave of the 
pandemic in Spain between end-2020 and early 2021 and 
the consequent restrictions on movement and activity 
meant that flows of tourists remained at very low levels in 
Q1. Looking ahead to the summer, the strides made with 
the vaccination campaigns in Spain and in the main 
tourism generating markets will only lead to a slight and 
partial recovery, insofar as sufficiently high levels of 
population immunity are yet to be achieved. In the 
projections, inbound tourism flows will not return to pre-
health crisis levels until end-2023.
Imports will also recover gradually over the projection 
horizon, in tandem with the trajectory of final demand. 
Further, growth in imports will be underpinned by the high 
momentum of components with a larger import content, 
such as investment in capital goods and exports. Similarly 
to exports, tourism by Spanish residents in the rest of the 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q1.
a Projections cut-off date: 27 May 2021.
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Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.5 15.2 13.7 12.8 15.6 14.7 13.7 16.2 15.7 14.6
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) of the nation 
(% of GDP) 1.1 1.9 3.7 3.7 1.5 3.1 3.1 0.8 2.1 2.3
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) (% 
of GDP) -11.0 -7.8 -4.1 -3.3 -8.2 -4.9 -4.3 -8.9 -5.9 -5.4
General government debt (% of GDP) 120.0 119.0 114.7 113.3 120.1 117.9 118.0 122.6 122.1 123.4
Benign scenario Baseline scenario Adverse scenario
June 2021 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP








world will remain very weak for a relatively extended 
period of time.
In the labour market, hours worked will return to an 
upward path as of Q2, in line with the recovery in output. 
Hours worked are projected to grow by 6.7% in 2021, 
subsequently moderating to 5.4% and 1.8% in 2022 and 
2023, respectively. This recovery in employment would 
lower unemployment, which would fall below its pre-
pandemic level as of end-2022.
The general government balance is expected to improve 
significantly over the projection horizon, after the acute 
deterioration in 2020. The decrease in the budget deficit 
will be due to the temporary nature of some of the 
discretionary measures adopted to contend with the 
fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical improvement. 
Nevertheless, the general government deficit will still be 
very high in 2023 (4.3% of GDP). As a result of these 
budget balance developments and the projected path for 
nominal GDP, the government debt-to-GDP ratio, which in 
2020 surged to 120%, would barely decline by 2 pp over 
the projection horizon.
Prices	and	costs
Since the early summer of 2020, core inflation has 
recorded rates of change of approximately zero. Such low 
growth rates are largely associated with the negative base 
effects stemming from the decline in the prices of the 
services hardest hit by the pandemic. The disappearance 
of these base effects as of summer 2021, together with 
the gradual recovery in demand for consumer goods and 
services, above all precisely in those sectors most 
adversely affected by the containment measures, appears 
to lead to gradual increases in the core inflation rate from 
mid-2021. Despite this upward pattern, core inflation will 
remain at moderate levels over the projection horizon to 
stand at 1.1% on average in 2023.
Headline HICP has increased considerably in 2021 to 
date. This is above all the result of the energy component, 
which is being highly influenced by the base effects 
stemming from the sharp drop in oil prices during the 
initial stages of the pandemic. In 2022, the marked 
deceleration in energy prices would comfortably offset the 
increase in the prices of services and, to a lesser degree, 
of non-energy industrial goods, such that the change in 
headline HICP would moderate to 1.2%, the level at which 
it would remain in 2023. 
Risks
The macroeconomic outlook remains highly uncertain. 
Among these uncertainties, the share of purely 
epidemiological aspects has fallen, against a background 
in which the vaccines have proven highly effective against 
the virus and the immunisation of the population has 
accelerated. However, epidemiological developments will 
continue to have a bearing on activity in the coming 
quarters, given the possibility of fresh bouts of infections, 
linked to a potential spread of variants of the virus that are 
more infectious and, in the worst-case scenario, resistant 
to vaccines. The likelihood of a variant with such 
characteristics emerging in Spain is low, given the 
headway made with the vaccination campaign, which has 
significantly reduced the spread of the virus. However, the 
probability of episodes of this kind arising from cases 
imported from abroad is somewhat higher. Nevertheless, 
in terms of the pandemic, the greatest risk to economic 
activity is the possible emergence of more contagious 
strains in emerging economies where the virus is more 
widely spread and fewer strides have been made with 
vaccination.
Furthermore, as described above, economic risks exist 
that, while linked to the pandemic, are essentially 
associated with how consumers might use the savings 
reservoir they have built up since the onset of the crisis, 
the pace of the recovery in tourism exports and the 
persistence of the effects of the crisis on potential growth 
(via the possible impact on long-term unemployment and 
business deaths). How all these risks might materialise 
has been captured by constructing alternative scenarios.
Lastly, these scenarios have not factored in other sources 
of uncertainty, such as how quickly the projects under the 
NGEU programme will be implemented and the difficulties 
of measuring their multiplier effect on activity, and the 
scope of the public policies to ward off fall-out effects 
from the crisis, help reallocate resources and drive the 
economy’s structural transformation. 
All these factors that may result in activity drifting from the 
pattern considered under the baseline scenario are also 
sources of uncertainty regarding the path of inflation. 
Further, under the baseline scenario it is assumed that 
there will be limited pass-through to final prices and 
wages of the higher input costs for firms. Otherwise, this 
would result in greater inflationary pressure. In the 








opposite direction, the response of consumer prices to 
the recovery in demand could be weaker than that 
included in the baseline scenario, in light of the low 
sensitivity of the former of these variables to the latter in 
recent years.
Considered overall, all these elements result in a risk 
profile that is balanced in relation to the projections’ 
baseline scenario in terms of both activity and prices.
ANNEX 1 
Projection assumptions
The assumptions are taken from the “June 2021 
Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro 
area”. The cut-off date for the data included in the 
projections is 18 May in all cases, except for Spain’s euro 
area export markets, for which it is 26 May. The 
assumptions regarding the paths of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and oil and other commodity prices are 
based on the prices observed in the respective markets 
in the 10 working days prior to that date. The paths for 
export markets and the prices of competitors in their 
domestic currency have been prepared by Eurosystem 
staff.
In comparison with the March scenarios, some notable 
changes to the assumptions used for the baseline 
scenario have been made. First, export market 
developments are now expected to be more favourable 
than was anticipated three months ago, especially in 2021 
and 2022, with upward revisions to growth rates of around 
1pp in 2021 and 2022 and 0.3 pp in 2023 with respect to 
the March projections. Second, oil prices are now 
somewhat higher than anticipated in March, especially in 
2022-2023. Following their sharp fall in 2020, oil prices 
increased notably in 2021, in line with the recovery in 
world demand. They are expected to stand on average 
this year at $65.8 per barrel, an upward revision to the 
March assumption of 1.4%. Subsequently, they are 
expected to trend downwards, reaching $61.9 in 2023 
(5.2% higher than in the March projections exercise). 
Third, non-energy commodity prices in 2021 have also 
been revised upwards significantly, with respect to March, 
but their subsequent downward trend is also more 
marked, so that in 2023 they will be somewhat lower than 
was anticipated three months ago. 
The other changes to the external assumptions used in 
March are more modest and, consequently, have a 
smaller impact on the projections. The euro exchange 
rate (assumed in the projection horizon using its spot 
market rate) has appreciated slightly compared with 
three months ago. The appreciation with respect to 
March is somewhat greater against the dollar than in 
nominal effective terms, but is no more than 2% in either 
case.
Lastly, the yields on securities traded on 10-year 
sovereign bond markets have followed a slightly upward 
trend in recent months, and, as a result, are somewhat 
higher over the projection horizon than in the March 
projections exercise. As for market expectations of short-
term interest rates, 3-month EURIBOR is assumed to rise 
slightly, from -0.5% in 2021 to -0.3% in 2023.
With regard to fiscal policy, the projections are based on 
the budgets for 2021 approved by the various tiers of 
government, as well as Spain’s Stability Programme 
Update for 2021-2024 (SPU 2021) and the RTRP recently 
sent to Brussels. The latest available budget outturn 
data, based on National Accounts criteria and published 
by the National Audit Office (IGAE), are taken into 
account.
With respect to the previous quarter, the new extension, 
to September this year, of the special benefits for self-
employed and furloughed workers approved on 27 May 11 
is incorporated, as are subsidies to businesses with 
viability problems as a result of the pandemic, which were 
approved in March.12 Also, the estimate of the revenue 
from the new taxes introduced at the beginning of this 
year or currently pending approval is revised slightly 
11  The conditions applicable to the self-employed and employees whose activity is suspended due to COVID-19 are slightly revised for this extension. 
Most notably, however, new exemptions from social contributions are introduced for workers returning to their jobs and for the self-employed who 
were receiving benefits on 31 May (see Royal Decree-Law 11/2011).
12  These measures include: €7 billion in the form of direct subsidies to businesses, €3 billion for debt restructuring and €1 billion for capital injections 
(see Royal Decree-Law 5/2021). The negative impact on the general government balance is €10 billion, since the capital injections raise general 
government financial assets and debt, but do not affect the budget balance. The projections assume that the bulk of this impact will take place in 
2021 (€8.5 billion).








downwards.13 14 All in all, the net overall impact on the 
general government deficit of the measures approved for 
this year amounts to 2.1% of GDP (2 pp less than in 2020).
Also, the assumptions on absorption by Spanish general 
government of the NGEU funds have been revised in the 
light of the new information contained in the RTRP (which, 
following its presentation on 30 April, must be approved 
shortly by the European authorities) and the SPU 2021. 
The degree of detail on the projects to be undertaken 
using NGEU funds is now greater. However, a considerable 
degree of uncertainty still remains regarding the rate at 
which these funds can be absorbed by Spanish general 
government and, consequently, regarding the timing of 
their use. The new projections for 2021 incorporate 
around 50% of the amount announced by the Government 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 18 May 2021. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated on the 
basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, in levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, in percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and in percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the June 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2021 2022 2023
International environment
    Spain's exports markets (c) Benign scenario 10.0 7.7 3.5 -0.1 1.9 0.3
Baseline scenario -10.9 8.6 6.4 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.3
Adverse scenario 5.1 3.3 3.3 1.6 0.3 -0.4
0.33.39.09.166.468.563.24)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.020.010.012.112.112.141.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
117.8 122.7 123.0 123.0 0.9 1.4 1.4
    Short-term interest rates
    (3-month Euribor) (e) -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
    Long-term interest rates
    (10-year Spanish government bond yield) (e)
Difference between the current 
projections and those of the 
corresponding scenario of 
March 2021 (b)
    Nominal effective exchange rate against the non-euro area (d)
    (2000=100)
June 2021 projections
Table 3
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rate of change, unless otherwise indicated 
13  This includes the new taxes on certain digital services and financial transactions and the tax increases included in the State Budget for 2021, as well 
as the new taxes on non-reusable plastics and waste, currently before Parliament. The estimated overall impact is revised slightly downwards on the 
basis of the latest information available and the latest government estimates included in the SPU 2021.
14  The impact on the 2021 public finances of the reversion to the State of various motorway sections owned by ACESA is also taken into account, as 
is the compensation of that company for construction work carried out (see SPU 2021).








for this year, considering both funds from the RRM and 
from REACT-EU. For the projection horizon as a whole, 
absorption is expected to be slightly above 80% of the 
total funds available in the form of grants, the largest 
stimulus being concentrated in 2022.
Beyond 2021, and excluding the impact of the European 
funds, the forecasts are based on the usual technical 
assumptions. In particular, those items subject to greater 
discretionality -such as public investment and 
procurement, in particular, given their volume- are 
expected to grow in line with the growth potential of the 
Spanish economy. Also, in the absence of specific 
measures, the trajectory of the remaining items of the 
general government accounts is assumed to be governed 
by their usual determinants.15
With these assumptions and forecasts for the fiscal 
policy variables, and given the output gap estimated in a 
manner consistent with the other macroeconomic 
projections, the fiscal policy stance, measured as the 
change in the primary structural balance, net of European 
funds,16 is expected to be clearly expansionary again in 
2021 (1.8 pp of GDP) and slightly expansionary in 2022 
(0.4 pp), becoming contractionary in 2023 (-1.0 pp). 
These changes reflect the fact that the largest annual 
stimulus from the European funds is estimated to occur 
in 2021.
15  The European NGEU funds to be received entail a smaller structural deficit, but not a more contractionary fiscal policy stance, as they do not result 
from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change in the primary structural balance 
must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.
16  The European NGEU funds to be received entail a smaller structural deficit, but not a more contractionary fiscal policy stance, as they do not result 
from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change in the primary structural balance 
must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.
